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This paper uses a wage setting survey of 1,305 Colombian firms to explore the nature 
and sources of wage rigidities. This is the first study of a non-European emerging 
economy that uses evidence from a survey of firms to analyse this topic. The survey 
was carried out during the first half of 2009, when the Colombian economy was 
showing signs of a slowdown in economic activity and increasing unemployment. The 
sample is fully representative of the population under study. The results provide 
evidence of nominal and real downward wage rigidities in the country. The most 
important factor in not reducing base wages during an economic slowdown is to avoid 
the loss of more experienced and productive workers, which is related to the efficiency 
wage theory in its adverse selection version. In addition, ordered logit regressions were 
used to determine what factors are related to wage rigidities. The findings indicate that, 
in general, permanent contracts, workforce composition, labour intensity and the 
presence of collective agreements play an important role in explaining wage rigidities 
in the country.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
It is important to understand the nature and causes of wage rigidities, since such rigidities 
partly determine the persistence and volatility of inflation, as one of the main components 
of the marginal cost. Also, wage rigidities offer a microeconomic explanation to a 
macroeconomic phenomenon: voluntary unemployment. As Tobin (1972) and Akerlof et 
al. (1996) state, when nominal wages are downwardly rigid, a certain level of inflation 
allows for a greater flexibility in real wages, thereby helping adjustments in the labour 
market. 
 
The reduction of inflation and the adoption of an inflation targeting regime, which took 
place in several countries during the past two decades, have renewed interest in the study 
of wage rigidities, due to the impact they can have on the labour market.
1 The Colombian 
case is no exception. Colombia has experienced a gradual fall in inflation since the 
beginning of the nineties; however, it was only after 1997 that inflation came close to the 
announced target.
2 The main decline in inflation took place between 1998 and 1999, 
when it went from 16.7% to 9.3%. Since then, inflation has remained in the single digit 
level. On the other hand, unemployment increased, reaching a peak in 1999-2000, when 
the economy faced a deep recession. By 2009, the scenario in Colombia was one of low 
inflation, high unemployment and signs of an economic slowdown (see Figure 1). Since 
                                                            
1  See, for example, European Central Bank, “Wage Dynamics in Europe: Final Report of the Wage 
Dynamics Network (WDN),” December 2009. 
2 In Colombia, explicit inflation targets have existed since 1991. For details on the implementation of an 
inflation targeting regime in Colombia, see Gómez et al. (2002). 3 
 
the aim of this paper is to study wage rigidities, the economic conditions prevailing in the 
country offer a suitable context for applying a unique survey to Colombian firms. 
 
Figure 1  
Inflation, unemployment and GDP growth in Colombia: 1991-2009 
 
Source: DANE and Banco de la República 
 
To explore wage setting mechanisms, analyse the nature and sources of wage rigidities 
and test different theories of wage rigidities in the country, we designed and applied a 
survey to Colombian firms. The survey allows us to obtain answers directly from those 
who set wages in a firm and helps us to understand the behaviour of firms and the labour 
market. In addition, it provides evidence for the micro-foundation of the Central Bank’s 
wage and price models, by incorporating real and nominal rigidities, and offers elements 
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A study of wage rigidities in an emerging country, such as Colombia, is also important 
because the country’s institutions and labour market could have characteristics that 
differentiate it from developed countries where this type of study has been concentrated. 
For instance, Colombia has high levels of informality. In fact, informal workers 
accounted, on average, for 58% of the total number of workers during the period 2001-
2007. Unlike the situation in Europe, union density in Colombia is very low:  less than 
5% in recent years (Guataquí et al., 2009). As a result, we would expect the role of unions 
in explaining wage rigidities in Colombia to be less important than in Europe. 
Furthermore, the legal minimum wage in Colombia plays a very important role in setting 
wage increases (Iregui et al. 2009b). Another aspect to highlight is the presence of high 
non-wage labour costs, which come to nearly 40% of base wages.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study for a non-European emerging 
economy that uses evidence from a survey of firms to identify and analyse downward 
wage rigidities. The literature on downward wage rigidities using firm surveys dates back 
to the studies of Kaufman (1984) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) for the United 
Kingdom, Holzer (1990), Blinder and Choi (1990), Bewley (1995, 1998, 1999) and 
Campbell and Kamlani (1997) for the United States, and Agell and Lundborg (1995, 
2003) for Sweden. In general, these studies found that firms do not cut wages because 
they do not want to affect the motivation, effort and morale of workers. Consequently, 
this leads to downward nominal wage rigidity. Similar results associated with efficiency 
wage theories in explaining wage rigidities were found recently by Agell and 
Bennmarker (2002, 2007) for Sweden, Franz and Pfeifer (2003, 2006) for Germany, 5 
 
Zoega and Karlsson (2006) for Iceland, Copaciu et al. (2010) for Rumania, Kawaguchi 
and Ohtake (2008) for Japan, and Amirault et al.(2009) for Canada. In addition, Franz 
and Pfeifer (2003) and Agell and Bennmarker (2002, 2007) found that the existence of 
collective agreements is another important factor in preventing wage cuts.  
 
The  Eurosystem Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), a research network composed of 
economists from the European Central Bank and the central banks of the European 
Union, conducted an ad hoc survey on price and wage setting behaviour among nearly 
17,000 firms in 17 countries of the European Union between the end of 2007 and the first 
half of 2008. The results of the WDN survey indicate the existence of significant 
downward rigidity in base wages in the European Union, with important cross-country 
differences. For example, downward nominal rigidity prevails in the Netherlands, Greece, 
Germany, Austria and Portugal, whereas downward real rigidity is more prevalent in 
Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden. According to the survey, the most 
important reasons for preventing wage cuts are the impact on work morale and effort, 




In particular, we applied our wage setting survey to 1,305 Colombian firms in the 
country’s thirteen main cities, taking into account nine economic sectors and three firm 
sizes. This survey has the advantage of using a representative sample of firms, which 
                                                            
3 For details on the WDN firm survey, see European Central Bank, Wage Dynamics in Europe: Final 
Report of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), December 2009. 6 
 
allows us to generalize the results to the population under study. As Campbell and 
Kamlani (1997), we designed the survey to obtain answers for different occupational 
groups, in our case, managers, professionals, technicians and assistants, and unskilled 
workers, since the reasons for wage rigidity may differ across types of workers. 
Regarding the response rate, it is important to mention that we obtained responses from 
1,305 firms. 
 
The survey asked firms how likely it is they will perform certain actions during a period 
of economic slowdown. Then, with the survey results and using ordered logit models, we 
empirically examine the firms’ responses, taking into account the firm-specific 
information collected for the survey. The survey also asked firms why they do not reduce 
wages in difficult times and provided respondents with a series of reasons based on the 
more relevant theories, so as to test which of them explain wage rigidities in the 
Colombian case. We also used ordered logit models to examine the firms’ responses in 
greater detail. 
 
The results of this study point to the presence of nominal and real downward wage 
rigidities in Colombia.
4 According to the survey, the most important reasons why 
Colombian firms do not cut wages during difficult times are to prevent loss of the most 
productive and experienced workers, not to affect worker’s effort and productivity, and 
not to affect worker’s motivation. These reasons are related to the efficiency wage theory, 
                                                            
4 This finding confirms previous micro-economic evidence of wage rigidities in Colombia; see Iregui et al. 
2009a. 7 
 
particularly to the adverse selection model, the shirking model, the gift-exchange model 
and the fair wage-effort hypothesis. Interestingly, these results are similar to those found 
in the literature for developed countries.  
 
Survey evidence also suggests that firms can resort to other alternatives to adjust costs in 
difficult times, besides changes in base wages, such as reducing non-statutory benefits 
and variable pay, laying off employees, changing the type of employment contract and 
hiring new workers at lower wages. The use of these strategies varies across economic 
sectors and occupational groups.  
 
This paper is divided into five sections, in addition to the introduction. In the second 
section, we describe the survey design and sample selection. The third section analyses 
the presence of downward nominal and real wage rigidities in Colombia and empirically 
test firms’ responses to the related questions. Section four studies the reasons for 
preventing wage cuts and empirically tests different theories on wage rigidities. In the 
fifth section, we discuss alternatives other than changes in base wages that firms could 
use to adjust labour costs during a period of economic slowdown. The final section 
presents the main conclusions. 
 
II.  Survey Design 
 
In this paper, the analysis is based on a unique survey of 1,305 Colombian firms. It was 
designed to explore wage setting mechanisms, the nature and sources of wage rigidities, 8 
 
and the link between wages and prices (see Iregui et al. 2009b). The survey also collects 
data on several characteristics of the firms in question, such as the economic sector where 
they operate, the kind of labour contracts they use, the existence of collective agreements 
and different types of remuneration, among other features, which helped us to 
characterize the firms in the empirical analysis. 
 
The survey has the advantage of using a representative sample of firms. This allowed us 
to generalize the results to the population under study: namely 39,004 small, medium and 
large scale enterprises
5, which are legally constituted and belong to all economic sectors, 
except the public sector.
6 The firms are located in 13 major cities
7, which account for 
70% of the formal employment in Colombia.  
 
The sample selection was done by stratified random sampling, considering nine strata and 
obtaining a final sample of 1,305 firms. The strata correspond to the following economic 
sectors: agriculture, forestry and fishing; trade; construction; electricity, gas, water and 
mining; manufacturing; financial services; transport, storage and communications; 
education and health; and other services. In addition, firm size was considered as a 
domain to guarantee that all sizes were represented in the final sample. With regard to the 
response rate, it is important to mention that responses were obtained from 1,305 firms. 
The firms that did not answer the questionnaire, for whatever reason, were replaced by 
                                                            
5 Firms with less than 10 employees were excluded. 
6 The public sector was excluded, because the wages of public employees are set mainly by government 
decree. 
7 The cities are Bogotá, Bucaramanga, Barranquilla, Cali, Cartagena, Medellín, Manizales, Pereira and their 
metropolitan areas. Barrancabermeja, Buga, Tuluá, Girardot and Rionegro were also included. 9 
 
companies with similar characteristics. To do so, we used a sample surplus to maintain its 
representativeness within the population.  
 
In the design of the questionnaire, certain questions were adapted from the literature. In 
particular, we considered the studies by Blinder and Choi (1990), Campbell and Kamlani 
(1997), Bewley (1999), Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2003), and Franz and Pfeiffer (2006). 
Preliminary versions of the questionnaire were discussed with senior specialists in survey 
design and human resources managers; this enriched the survey.
8  
 
The selected firms were contacted first by telephone; those showing interest in answering 
the survey were sent a letter explaining the academic purpose of the study and 
emphasising the confidentiality of the information provided. Once the company agreed to 
participate in our survey, a face-to-face interview was scheduled to apply the 
questionnaire. The survey was directed to human resources personnel involved with wage 
policies, who should be able to answer the questions for different occupational groups 
(managers, professionals, technicians and assistants, and unskilled workers). The survey 
was carried out during the first semester of 2009, when the Colombian economy was 
showing signs of a slowdown in economic activity, low inflation and increasing 
unemployment.  
 
Finally, it is important to mention that all the results presented hereafter are generalized 
for the population. The Coefficients of variation (cve) were calculated for each answer; 
                                                            
8 A Spanish version of the questionnaire is available in Iregui et al. (2009b), Appendix 4.  10 
 
the coefficients obtained did not exceed 5%, which is an indicator of the reliability of the 
population estimates. 
 
III.  Downward Nominal and Real Wage Rigidities 
 
To assess whether wages are downward rigid, we asked firms about the likelihood of 
performing certain actions during a period of economic slowdown, using a scale from 1 
to 4, where 1 is not at all and 4 is very likely. To allow for comparisons, we calculated the 
mean score of the answers. Following Blinder (1991), a mean score greater than or equal 
to 3.0 is considered excellent and a score of less than 1.5 is very poor; a mean score 
greater than or equal to 2.5 is considered to be reasonably strong. 
 
In particular, to identify downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR), the options of either 
reducing or freezing base wages were considered. For downward real wage rigidity 
(DRWR), the alternative of increasing basic pay at a rate lower than inflation was 
included.
9 Table 1 shows the percentage of responses not at all / not likely and likely / 
very likely for each occupational position, as well as the mean scores obtained for the 





9 According to Colombian law, the purchasing power of the minimum wage must be maintained. Then, the 
previous alternatives can be considered only for base wages higher than the legal minimum wage. 11 
 
Table 1 
How likely is your firm to carry out the following actions? 
 




Pay raises below 
the inflation rate 
Managers     
Mean score*  2.33  1.52  2.13 
Responses (%)       
Not at all / not likely 54.0  85.9  59.6 
Likely / very likely 46.0  14.1  40.4 
      
Professionals     
Mean score*  2.33  1.52  2.17 
Responses (%)       
Not at all / not likely 53.8  86.4  57.9 
Likely / very likely 46.2  13.6  42.1 
      
Technicians, assistants, 
and unskilled workers      
Mean score*  2.04  1.45  1.96 
Responses (%)       
Not at all / not likely 67.7  89.3  68.2 
Likely / very likely 32.3  10.7  31.8 
*Average score based on the following scale: 1 = not at all, 2 = not likely, 3 = likely, 4 = very likely. 
Source: Authors calculations.  
 
The results suggest the presence of DNWR, considering that, in all cases, more than 85% 
of the firms indicated the option of reducing base pay was not at all / not likely and the 
mean score was 1.5, indicating a very low likelihood of occurrence. In addition, more 
than half the firms replied that the alternative of not increasing base wages was not at all 
/ not likely. The option of pay raises below the inflation rate had a mean score of around 
2.0 for all occupational groups and it is not at all / not likely for about 60% of the firms in 
the case of managers and professionals and 70% of the firms for technicians, assistants 
and unskilled workers, all of which provides evidence of DRWR. It is worth mentioning 
that the results show no important differences by firm size. However, across sectors, the 12 
 
results do show some variation.
10 For instance, in financial services, the alternatives of 
reducing base pay and not increasing base wages have a percentage of response for not 
at all / not likely that is considerably higher than in the other sectors. In the construction 
sector, the alternative of pay raises below the inflation rate has the highest response rates 
for not at all / not likely compared to all occupations (73% on average). 
 
The answers concerning wage rigidities are consistent with the results obtained when the 
firms were asked about the last annual effective wage increase. Figure 2 shows the 
histograms of the distribution of the average nominal wage change for each occupational 
position between 2008 and 2009, when the country was showing signs of a slowdown in 
economic activity. As illustrated, none of the companies cut wages and there is a spike 
around the observed rate of inflation, 7.67%. In the case of unskilled workers, wage 
changes were concentrated around this value for about 60% of the firms; however, for 
managers, this proportion declines to about 40%. Furthermore, wage freezes are less 
frequent among less-skilled workers, since they might be protected by collective 
agreements. 
 
Next, to test the relevance of the firm’s characteristics for the responses, we estimated 
ordered logit models for each action and occupational group. The dependent variable 
increases with the likelihood of carrying out such actions. It takes values from 1 to 4, 
where 1 = not at all, 2 = not likely, 3 = likely and 4 = very likely. The threshold 
parameters estimated in all the models are statistically different from one another; 
                                                            
10 These results may be obtained from the authors upon request. 13 
 




Histograms of the distribution of the last nominal wage increase, 2009/2008 
 
   
   
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The explanatory variables allow for differences in economic sectors and the location of 
the firms (region); we considered trade and cities other than Bogotá (the nation’s capital) 
as the reference categories in the regressions. Firm size also is included and is measured 
by the number of employees (log (No. employees)). In addition, the share of managers 
                                                            
11 A Wald test was used to test the difference among the threshold parameters. The results of the tests, as 





















































































































and professionals (skilled workers), the percentage of workers earning the minimum 
wage (minimum wage earners), and the share of employees with a permanent 
employment contract (permanent workers) were included to take into account the 
characteristics and composition of the labour force. Moreover, a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1, if the firm has any form of collective agreement (collective 
agreements), and a measure of union density (union members (%)) were considered to 
evaluate the importance of collective wage agreements. Furthermore, we included 
dummy variables to account for the presence of flexible benefits and variable pay.
12 
Finally, labour costs as a share of total costs were also included to approximate labour 
intensity. 
 
Table 2 shows the ordered logit estimates for the alternatives do not increase base wages 
and  reduce base wages. According to the results for all occupational groups, the 
probability that firms do not increase base wages in an economic slowdown increases 
with the share of labour costs as a portion of total costs, as expected. Moreover, this 
strategy in firms operating in the construction, manufacturing and financial services is 
less likely than for firms in the trade sector (the reference category), where the high share 
of temporary workers could affect the bargaining power of employees. Regarding the 
composition of the labour force, in the case of managers and professionals the probability 
that firms do not increase base wages decreases as the share of skilled workers increases. 
This could be explained by the difficulty in recruiting employees of this type, as our 
                                                            
12 Flexible benefits correspond to a formal plan whereby employees can choose among different employer-
paid benefits or take cash. Variable pay corresponds to a form of compensation that links employee 
payment to some measure of job performance. 15 
 
survey indicates. The presence of flexible benefits is statistically significant only in the 
case of managers, where such benefits account for approximately 15% of their 
remuneration. Finally, in the case of technicians, assistants and unskilled workers, as firm 
size and the share of minimum wage earners increase, the likelihood of not increasing 
base wages declines; this is also true for firms operating in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing sectors. 
 
The results for the alternative of reducing base wages are also reported in Table 2. For all 
occupational positions, we found the likelihood of reducing base wages decreases as the 
share of employees on permanent contract increases, which suggests these workers have 
more bargaining power. In the particular case of managers, firms located in Bogotá are 
less likely to reduce wages than in other cities of the country and firms in other services 
and electricity, gas, water and mining, the probability of reducing wages is higher than in 
the trade sector. For technicians, assistants and unskilled workers, the likelihood of 
reducing wages declines as the percentage of union member’s increases, suggesting that 
collective agreements are one of the main reasons for wage rigidity in this occupational 
group. 
 
We also examined what kind of firm is more prone to increase wages at a rate less than 
that of inflation. In general, the results show that the probability of using this alternative 
decreases as the share of labour costs increases, suggesting the presence of DRWR is 
more likely in firms that are less labour intensive. At the sector level, firms belonging in 
the “other services” sector are more likely to increase wages below the inflation rate.  16 
 
Table 2 
How likely it is for a firm not to increase base wages or to reduce base wages 
(Ordered logit estimates, weighted) 
 
  Not to increase base wages  Reduce base wages 
Variables Managers  Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing  -0.123  (0.217)  -0.327  (0.238)  -0.594
***  (0.236) -0.040  (0.238) -0.244  (0.254) -0.279  (0.250) 
Construction -0.805
*** (0.234)  -0.619
** (0.227)  -0.529
***  (0.211) -0.369  (0.253) 0.120  (0.236) 0.352
* (0.228) 
Electricity, gas, water, mining  -0.105  (0.248)  -0.414
* (0.253) -0.188  (0.227) 0.487
* (0.290)  0.451
* (0.295)  0.372  (0.283) 
Manufacturing -0.396
** (0.199) -0.410
** (0.207)  -0.511
***  (0.188) 0.101  (0.214) 0.370
* (0.229)  0.288  (0.221) 
Financial services  -0.764
*** (0.305)  -0.696
*** (0.298)  -1.316
***  (0.316) -0.493  (0.377) -0.501  (0.364) -0.643
* (0.388) 
Transport,  storage  and  comm. -0.031  (0.168) -0.009  (0.183) -0.209  (0.180) -0.122  (0.212) -0.119  (0.222) 0.023  (0.212) 
Education  and  health  -0.118  (0.263) -0.064  (0.286) -0.350  (0.256) 0.181  (0.317) 0.222  (0.318) -0.098  (0.311) 
Other services  0.203  (0.166)  0.109  (0.185)  -0.035  (0.174)  0.467
***  (0.213) 0.315  (0.219) 0.166  (0.210) 
Region -0.214
* (0.128)  -0.050  (0.134) 0.177  (0.122) -0.311
***  (0.137) -0.105  (0.141) -0.137  (0.137) 
Log (No. employees)  0.010  (0.048)  -0.049  (0.051)  -0.074
* (0.045) -0.063  (0.060) -0.072  (0.059) -0.051  (0.056) 
Skilled workers (%)  -0.006
** (0.003) -0.007
***  (0.003) -0.002  (0.003) -0.004  (0.003) -0.002  (0.003) 0.004  (0.003) 
Minimum wage earners (%)  0.002  (0.002)  0.003  (0.003)  -0.004
* (0.002) 0.002  (0.002) 0.004  (0.003) 0.001  (0.003) 
Flexible benefits   0.232
**  (0.129)  0.128 (0.135)  0.035 (0.135)  0.157 (0.147)  0.193 (0.154)  0.000 (0.151) 
Variable  pay  0.108  (0.129) 0.018  (0.138) -0.090  (0.127) 0.026  (0.155) -0.085  (0.160) -0.075  (0.152) 
Collective  agreements  -0.264  (0.243) -0.245  (0.241) -0.181  (0.238) 0.226  (0.252) 0.154  (0.256) 0.184  (0.270) 
Union  members  (%)  0.006  (0.005) 0.006  (0.005) -0.002  (0.005) -0.005  (0.005) -0.007  (0.006) -0.010
* (0.007) 
Labour costs (%)  0.006
** (0.003)  0.007
** (0.003) 0.007
** (0.004) 0.002  (0.004) 0.006  (0.004) 0.005  (0.004) 
Permanent workers (%)  0.001  (0.002)  -0.001  (0.002)  0.000  (0.002)  -0.004
** (0.002)  -0.005
*** (0.002)  -0.003
** (0.002) 
              
Number  of  observations 1,266 1,163 1,283 1,266 1,163 1,283 
Pseudo R
2  0.023 0.020 0.027 0.022 0.023 0.017 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases with the 
likelihood, ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=not at all, 2 = not likely, 3 = likely and 4 = very likely.  
Source: Authors calculations. 17 
 
IV.  Reasons Preventing Wage Cuts 
 
In this section, we analyse the reasons why firms do not reduce base wages in difficult 
times and test different theories of wage rigidity. In particular, the contract theory states 
that companies and their employees sign long-term agreements so wages are fixed in 
advance, the idea being to maintain a stable real wage throughout the business cycle (see 
Baily, 1974; Azariadis, 1975, Taylor, 1979). With the insider-outsider theory, companies 
are reluctant to fire their employees (insiders) and to hire unemployed workers (outsiders) 
at lower wages, because of the cost involved in hiring and training new workers. In 
addition, insiders can refuse to cooperate with new incoming employees. This increases 
the possibility of reducing the firm’s productivity, giving insiders power to negotiate their 
wages (see Lindbeck and Snower 2001). 
 
According to the efficiency wage theory, workers’ productivity is a function of their 
wages. This theory has several versions, including the shirking model, the adverse 
selection model, the labour turnover model, the gift exchange model and the fair wage – 
effort hypothesis. With the shirking model, the cost of losing a job depends positively on 
the wage (see Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984); with the adverse selection model, the most 
productive workers are the most likely to resign in the event of a wage reduction, (see 
Weiss, 1990); with the labour turnover model, workers’ resignation rates depend 
negatively on the wage rate (see Stiglitz 1974); with the gift exchange model, the loyalty 
of workers is directly related to their salary, and this loyalty leads to higher productivity 
(see Akerlof 1982, 1984); and with the fair wage-effort hypothesis, workers’ effort 18 
 
declines if the salary they receive is below what they perceive as a fair wage (see Akerlof 
and Yellen, 1990). 
 
In simple and nontechnical language, the respondents were presented with a number of 
reasons associated with the theories mentioned above, which explain why firms do not 
reduce wages (see Table 3). We asked the interviewees to indicate the importance of each 
reason based on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 is not important and 4 is very important. The 
average scores obtained were ordered and t statistics were calculated for each option to 
test whether the mean differences between contiguous alternatives were statistically 
significant. In all cases, the results show the null hypothesis of equal average scores for 
contiguous actions is rejected, with a confidence level of 99%.
13  
 
Table 4 reports the means scores for all occupational groups, as well as the response rates 
not important / of minor importance and moderately important / very important for the 
different reasons preventing wage cuts. The alternative with the highest mean score was 
to prevent the loss of the most productive and experienced workers. This reason receives 
the highest response rate as the most important explanation for not cutting wages paid to 
managers and professionals. This reason is related to the efficiency wage theory, 
specifically to the adverse selection model. Similar results were found by Campbell and 
Kamlani (1997) for the United States, Zoega and Karlsson (2006) for Iceland, Martins 
(2009) for Portugal and Copaciu et al. (2010) for Romania. 
 
                                                            
13 These results may be obtained from the authors upon request. 19 
 
Table 3 
Theories associated to wage rigidity 
 
Proposed reasons  Associated theory 
To prevent the loss of the most productive and 
more experienced workers 
Efficiency wages (adverse selection) 
To prevent the loss of the firm’s reputation  Efficiency wages (firm’s reputation) 
Do not affect employee’s motivation  Efficiency wages (fair wage-effort 
hypothesis, gift exchange) 
Do not affect workers’ efforts and productivity  Efficiency wages (shirking, fair wage-
effort hypothesis, gift exchange) 
Previous agreements between employees and 
employers  
Contracts theory 
Minimize costs of labour turnover  Efficiency wages (minimize turnover) 
Do not affect relative wages in relation to 
competition (outside the firm) 
Keynesian theory 
Legal restrictions  Contract theory  
Collective agreements  Insider-Outsider 




Importance of the following reasons in preventing wage cuts 
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Collective agreements   1.90(9) 69.9  30.4 2.22(8) 56.5  43.5 3.00(5) 27.2  72.8 
Legal restrictions  2.03(8) 64.4  35.6 2.03(9) 64.8  35.2 2.08(9) 62.6  37.4 
Previous agreements between employees and 
employers 
2.51(5) 43.9  56.1 2.67(5) 35.3  64.7 2.70(6) 36.1  63.9 
To prevent the loss of the firm’s reputation  3.14(2) 22.0  78.0 3.13(4) 21.1  78.9 3.15(4) 21.2  78.8 
Do not affect employee’s motivation  3.01(3) 26.8  73.2 3.21(3) 16.9  83.1 3.30(3) 14.8  85.2 
Do not affect workers’ efforts and 
productivity 
2.98(4) 27.2  72.8 3.22(2) 17.1  82.9 3.33(2) 14.4  85.6 
Minimize costs of labour turnover  2.48(6) 45.0  55.0 2.60(6) 40.8  59.2 2.61(7) 39.7  60.3 
To prevent the loss of the most productive and 
more experienced workers 
3.16(1) 21.5  78.5 3.34(1) 14.0  86.0 3.35(1) 14.9  85.1 
Do not affect relative wages in relation to 
competition (outside the firm) 
2.28(7) 53.2  46.8 2.28(7) 51.7  48.3 2.28(8) 54.2  45.8 
*Average scores based on the following scale: 1 = not important, 2 = of minor importance, 3 = moderately important, 4 = very important. 
Note: The numbers in parentheses correspond to the order obtained by each action.  




The survey also found that do not affect worker’s effort and productivity and do not affect 
worker’s motivation are very important reasons for not reducing base wages. These 
alternatives also are related to the efficiency wage theory, particularly to the shirking 
model, the gift exchange model and the fair wage-effort hypothesis. Despite differences 
in the labour market institutions, our results are similar to those found for developed 
countries. For instance, Bewley (1995, 1999 and 2004) found, for the United States, that 
employers do not cut wages because of the effect doing so might have on workers’ 
morale and motivation. Similar evidence was found by Blinder and Choi (1990) and 
Campbell and Kamlani (1997) for the United States, Kaufman (1984) for the United 
Kingdom, Agell and Bennmarker (2002, 2007) for Sweden, Franz and Pfeiffer (2003) for 
Germany, Kawaguchi and Ohtake (2008) for Japan, Martins (2009) for Portugal and the 
Wage Dynamics Network (European Central Bank, 2009 and Babecký et al. 2009a) for 
different European countries.  
 
Another important reason mentioned by respondents for not cutting base wages is to 
prevent the loss of the firm’s reputation. For technicians, assistants and unskilled 
workers, as opposed to managers and professionals, strong support was found for the 
existence of collective agreements, which might be associated to the insider-outsider 
theory.
14 Similarly, Franz and Pfeiffer (2003) found that labour union contracts explain 
wage rigidities for the less skilled workers in German firms. In Sweden, the high rate of 
unionization explains the wage rigidity in all positions (Agell and Bennmarker, 2002, 
                                                            
14 The insider-outsider theory considers union members as insiders who show little concern for non-
members (outsiders). These insiders have power when negotiating wages. 22 
 
2007).
15 In Colombia, when firms are classified by payroll size, this option receives more 
support in large firms than in small ones, possibly because of the fact that collective 
agreements are more prevalent in larger firms.
16 Across sectors, this option obtains the 
highest response rates in electricity, gas, water and mining and manufacturing, where the 
number of firms with collective agreements (26.1% and 19.6% respectively) is above 
average (9.3%). 
 
Other reasons receive less support in explaining why firms do not cut wages. Moderate 
support was found for minimize costs of labour turnover, especially in large firms and in 
the “other services” sector. However, in the construction sector this option obtains the 
lowest response rate among all sectors, possibly because of an excess of labour supply in 
this sector. As mentioned by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Agell and Bennmarker 
(2002), firms do not reduce wages to avoid an increase in the number of resignations. 
According to our survey, a better wage offer is one of the main reasons why workers 
resign, which might indicate that firms perceive the risk of voluntary turnover as a wage-
policy constraint. 
 
Then, we controlled for factors that might explain wage rigidities in the country by 
estimating ordered logit models. The dependent variable takes values from 1 to 4, where 
1 = not important, 2 = of minor importance, 3 = moderately important and 4 = very 
                                                            
15 In Sweden, the union density rate was 75.1% in 2006; in Germany, it was 14.6% (data available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=U_D_D). In Colombia, this rate was 3.4% in 2007 (Guataquí 
et al. 2009). 
16 According to the results of our survey, 35% of the large firms have collective agreements as opposed to 
only 3% of the small firms. 23 
 
important. As before, we used the same set of benchmark regressors and kept four 
categories for the dependent variable in all the models, since the threshold parameters are 
statistically different from one another.  
 
The results for the reason rated as the most important for not cutting wages, namely to 
prevent the loss of the most productive and more experienced workers are reported in 
Table 5. In the case of managers, the main findings indicate the size of the firm, its 
geographic location and the sector where it operates affect the probability of rating this 
reason as important. In particular, greater support for the adverse selection model is found 
among larger firms and those operating in the “other services” sector. On the contrary, 
less support is found among firms located outside the nation’s capital and those operating 
in construction, manufacturing, financial services and education and health, compared to 
the trade sector. For professionals, the probability of rating this reason as important is 
statistically significant only for firms involved in transport, storage and communications 
and “other services”; however, for technicians, assistants and unskilled workers, it is 










Importance of the following reasons in preventing wage cuts 
(Ordered logit estimates, weighted) 
 





To prevent the loss of the most productive and more experienced 
workers 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing  0.091  (0.225)  0.307  (0.225)  0.026  (0.218) 
Construction -0.746
***  (0.210)  -0.065 (0.216)  -0.171 (0.221) 
Electricity, gas, water, mining  0.374  (0.282)  0.241  (0.289)  0.195  (0.282) 
Manufacturing -0.491
***  (0.217)  0.140 (0.226)  0.207 (0.216) 
Financial services  -0.829
*** (0.293)  0.118  (0.347)  -0.043  (0.344) 
Transport, storage and comm.  -0.333
* (0.195) 0.586
*** (0.213)  0.391
** (0.206) 
Education and health  -0.458
* (0.260) 0.388  (0.283) -0.060  (0.262) 
Other services  0.444
*** (0.191) 0.452
*** (0.203)  0.033  (0.184) 
Region -0.729
***  (0.132)  -0.190 (0.142)  -0.165 (0.138) 
Log (No. employees)  0.218
*** (0.055) 0.066  (0.059)  -0.015  (0.056) 
Skilled workers (%)  0.002  (0.003)  -0.001  (0.003)  -0.004  (0.003) 
Minimum  wage  earners  (%)  -0.002 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003)  -0.003 (0.003) 
Flexible benefits   0.069  (0.148)  0.145  (0.154)  0.196  (0.147) 
Variable  pay  0.175 (0.133)  0.215 (0.148)  0.159 (0.144) 
Collective  agreements  -0.086 (0.283)  -0.228 (0.299)  -0.380 (0.279) 
Union members (%)  0.001  (0.006)  0.001  (0.007)  -0.001  (0.005) 
Labour costs (%)  0.001  (0.004)  0.003  (0.004)  0.006  (0.004) 
Permanent workers (%)  0.001  (0.002)  0.001  (0.002)  0.000  (0.002) 
        
Number of observations  1266  1163  1283 
Pseudo R
2 0.043  0.011  0.009 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases with the importance, ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=not 
important, 2 = of minor importance, 3 = moderately important and 4 = very important. 
Source: Authors calculations.  
 
For the alternatives do not affect employee’s motivation and do not affect worker’s effort 
and productivity, the results indicate the probability that the firms rate each of these 
reasons as important increases with the number of employees. Agell and Bennmarker 
(2007) point out that wage rigidity might be an issue in larger firms because of shirking, 
since it is more difficult for them to supervise workers’ effort. In addition, the importance 25 
 
of these reasons increases for firms in the “other services” sector, which includes highly 
specialized activities that require a particular expertise.
17 On the contrary, the importance 
of these alternatives is less for firms located in Bogotá compared to the rest of the 
country. In the case of managers, the economic sector where the firm operates could 
significantly increase or decrease the probability of rating these two alternatives as 
important, compared to the trade sector. For instance, the probability reduces for firms in 
construction, manufacturing and financial services, whereas it increases for firms 




17 This sector includes activities such as software consultancy and supply; maintenance and repair of office; 
accounting and computing machinery; research and experimental development in natural sciences, 
engineering, social sciences and humanities; legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax 
consultancy; market research and public opinion polling; business and management consultancy; and 
advertising, among other activities. 26 
 
Table 6 
Importance of the following reasons in preventing wage cuts 
(Ordered logit estimates, weighted) 





Do not affect employee’s motivation  Do not affect workers’ efforts and productivity 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Agriculture,  forestry,  fishing  0.045  (0.228) 0.160  (0.224) -0.176  (0.209) -0.175  (0.224) 0.078  (0.223) -0.068  (0.218) 
Construction -0.717
***  (0.227) -0.076  (0.221) -0.176  (0.218) -0.818
***  (0.234) 0.028  (0.214) -0.127  (0.216) 
Electricity, gas, water, mining  0.466
** (0.259) 0.149  (0.269) -0.010  (0.273) 0.447
*  (0.252) 0.181  (0.266) 0.156  (0.282) 
Manufacturing -0.701
***  (0.196) -0.213  (0.221) -0.235  (0.213) -0.779
***  (0.193) 0.048  (0.221) -0.128  (0.207) 
Financial services  -0.906
***  (0.308) -0.315  (0.337) -0.338  (0.334) -1.088
***  (0.304) -0.170  (0.350) -0.263  (0.360) 
Transport, storage and comm.  0.090  (0.196)  0.677
*** (0.209)  0.501
***  (0.198) -0.117  (0.193) 0.810
*** (0.208)  0.595
*** (0.209) 
Education  and  health  -0.337  (0.271) -0.082  (0.266) -0.185  (0.257) -0.178  (0.287) 0.047  (0.286) -0.211  (0.264) 
Other services  0.981
*** (0.192) 0.582
***  (0.197) 0.093  (0.185) 0.889
*** (0.191)  0.585
*** (0.192)  0.190  (0.187) 
Region -0.908
*** (0.136)  -0.399
*** (0.139)  -0.284
** (0.135)  -1.025
*** (0.135)  -0.379
*** (0.140)  -0.328
*** (0.140) 
Log (No. employees)  0.211
*** (0.056) 0.153
*** (0.054)  0.084
* (0.053)  0.220
*** (0.055)  0.155
*** (0.056)  0.091
* (0.054) 
Skilled  workers  (%)  0.003  (0.003) 0.004  (0.003) 0.001  (0.003) 0.001  (0.003) 0.003  (0.003) 0.000  (0.003) 
Minimum  wage  earners  (%)  0.000  (0.003) 0.000  (0.003) -0.001  (0.003) 0.001  (0.003) 0.000  (0.003) -0.001  (0.003) 
Flexible  benefits    -0.052  (0.143) 0.019  (0.144) 0.055  (0.141) -0.042  (0.141) 0.187  (0.146) 0.107  (0.144) 
Variable pay  0.297
** (0.134) 0.180  (0.144) 0.207  (0.137) 0.167  (0.130) 0.089  (0.142) 0.063  (0.138) 
Collective  agreements  0.190  (0.257) -0.032  (0.238) 0.057  (0.237) 0.221  (0.276) -0.091  (0.253) -0.184  (0.243) 
Union  members  (%)  -0.002  (0.007) 0.002  (0.006) -0.001  (0.005) -0.002  (0.006) -0.003  (0.006) -0.005  (0.006) 
Labour costs (%)  -0.006
* (0.003) -0.001  (0.004) 0.000  (0.004) -0.007
**  (0.003) -0.002  (0.004) 0.002  (0.004) 
Permanent workers (%)  0.002  (0.002)  0.003
** (0.002) 0.001  (0.002) 0.003
** (0.002) 0.004
** (0.002) 0.002  (0.002) 
              
Number  of  observations  1266 1163 1283 1266 1163 1283 
Pseudo R
2  0.062 0.020 0.011 0.068 0.019 0.012 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases with the 
importance, ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=not important, 2 = of minor importance, 3 = moderately important and 4 = very important.  
Source: Authors calculations.  27 
 
Similarly, as can be seen in Table 7, for the reasons minimize costs of labour turnover 
and do not affect relative wages in relation to competition (outside the firm), the size of 
the firm, its location and economic sector are significant in explaining why firms rate 
these reasons as important in preventing wage cuts. 
 
It is worth mentioning that in order to evaluate the explanatory power of collective 
agreements as a reason for preventing wage cuts, an ordered logit model was also 
estimated (see Table 8). Only in the case of technicians, assistants and unskilled workers 
was the share of unionized workers found to be positive and highly significant; this is 
indicative of the bargaining power these workers might have. In addition, the results 
show that, for most sectors, the coefficients are negative and significant with respect to 
the trade sector where union density is very low (according to our survey, only 2.2% of 
the firms in this sector have unions).  
 
Regarding the reasons associated with the contract theory, legal restrictions and previous 
agreements between employees and employers (see Tables 8 and 9, respectively), the 
results show that firms located in Bogotá are more likely to consider these reasons as an 
explanation for wage rigidity. In the particular case of previous agreements, the 
coefficient of the share of employees who have a permanent contract is negative and 
highly significant. As suggested by Agell and Benmarker (2007), the bargaining power of 




Importance of the following reasons in preventing wage cuts 
(Ordered logit estimates, weighted) 





Minimize costs of labour turnover  Do not affect relative wages in relation to competition (outside 
the firm) 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing  -0.239  (0.225)  -0.258  (0.245)  -0.455
**  (0.229) -0.201  (0.234) -0.062  (0.250) -0.202  (0.227) 
Construction -0.820
*** (0.209)  -0.711
*** (0.205)  -0.519
*** (0.199)  -0.415
**  (0.204) -0.232  (0.201) -0.125  (0.191) 
Electricity,  gas,  water,  mining 0.194  (0.266) -0.110  (0.286) -0.041  (0.276) 0.381  (0.253) 0.244  (0.269) 0.336  (0.243) 
Manufacturing -0.889
*** (0.193)  -0.598
*** (0.202)  -0.471
*** (0.194)  -0.716
*** (0.189)  -0.558
*** (0.200)  -0.461
*** (0.191) 
Financial services  -1.009
*** (0.3479  -0.870
*** (0.308)  -0.728
*** (0.282)  -0.983
*** (0.353)  -1.120
*** (0.333)  -0.881
*** (0.341) 
Transport, storage and comm.  -0.496
*** (0.184)  -0.144  (0.189)  0.011  (0.179)  -0.516
*** (0.190)  -0.474
*** (0.208)  -0.324
* (0.193) 
Education  and  health  -0.188  (0.273) -0.072  (0.270) -0.052  (0.256) -0.136  (0.241) -0.154  (0.234) 0.062  (0.226) 
Other services  0.753
*** (0.184) 0.574
*** (0.195)  0.442
*** (0.184)  0.517
*** (0.192)  0.461
*** (0.197)  0.616
*** (0.184) 
Region -0.718
*** (0.133)  -0.488
*** (0.141)  -0.321
*** (0.132)  -0.765
*** (0.129)  -0.715
*** (0.135)  -0.676
*** (0.126) 
Log (No. employees)  0.185
*** (0.052) 0.159
*** (0.053)  0.120
*** (0.047)  0.227
*** (0.057)  0.237
*** (0.055)  0.134
*** (0.050) 
Skilled  workers  (%)  0.001 (0.003)  0.001 (0.003)  0.000 (0.003)  0.003 (0.003)  0.004 (0.003)  -0.001  (0.003) 
Minimum  wage  earners  (%) 0.001 (0.002)  0.002 (0.003)  0.001 (0.002)  -0.001  (0.002)  0.000 (0.003)  -0.004  (0.002) 
Flexible  benefits    0.061  (0.139) 0.158  (0.144) 0.176  (0.138) -0.105  (0.130) -0.125  (0.139) -0.109  (0.130) 
Variable  pay  0.178 (0.132)  0.132 (0.138)  0.087 (0.130)  0.170 (0.137)  0.141 (0.140)  0.076 (0.131) 
Collective  agreements  0.189  (0.266) -0.028  (0.271) -0.148  (0.260) 0.291  (0.222) 0.218  (0.236) 0.317  (0.223) 
Union  members  (%)  0.002 (0.006)  0.005 (0.006)  0.006 (0.006)  0.001 (0.005)  0.002 (0.005)  0.001 (0.005) 
Labour  costs  (%)  -0.006  (0.004) -0.003  (0.004) -0.001  (0.004) 0.003  (0.004) 0.002  (0.004) 0.002  (0.004) 
Permanent  workers  (%)  -0.001  (0.002) -0.001  (0.002) -0.001  (0.002) 0.002  (0.002) 0.002  (0.002) 0.001  (0.002) 
              
Number  of  observations  1266 1163 1283 1266 1163 1283 
Pseudo R
2  0.055 0.036 0.024 0.048 0.043 0.034 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases with the 
importance, ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=not important, 2 = of minor importance, 3 = moderately important and 4 = very important.  




Importance of the following reasons in preventing wage cuts 
(Ordered logit estimates, weighted) 





Collective agreements  Legal restrictions 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing  -0.898  (0.784)  -1.800
*** (0.731)  -1.638
***  (0.709) -0.188  (0.222) -0.191  (0.236) 0.011  (0.220) 
Construction  -0.573 (0.952)  -2.302 (0.788)  -2.080 (1.365)  -0.829
*** (0.221)  -0.817
*** (0.222)  -0.79
***0 (0.215) 
Electricity, gas, water, mining  -1.217  (0.863)  -1.116
***  (0.788) -0.008  (0.800) -0.101  (0.236) -0.192  (0.245) -0.162  (0.236) 
Manufacturing -1.065
* (0.684) -1.530
*** (0.598)  -1.201
** (0.586)  -0.931
*** (0.194)  -0.933
*** (0.201)  -0.787
*** (0.189) 
Financial services  -0.989  (0.947)  -1.695
** (0.799)  -1.539
** (0.820)  -0.839
*** (0.349)  -1.014
*** (0.353)  -0.951
*** (0.333) 
Transport, storage and comm.  -1.325
* (0.797) -1.695
*** (0.690)  -1.870
*** (0.753)  -0.522
*** (0.196)  -0.682
*** (0.210)  -0.442
*** (0.191) 
Education and health  0.307  (0.999)  -0.142  (0.981)  -1.716
* (1.067) -0.262  (0.283) -0.366  (0.295) -0.375  (0.273) 
Other services  -0.944  (0.863)  -2.341
*** (0.756)  -2.180
***  (0.843) -0.090  (0.190) -0.189  (0.205) -0.292  (0.193) 
Region -0.749
** (0.407) -0.154  (0.386)  -0.605
* (0.372) -0.678
*** (0.130)  -0.633
*** (0.134)  -0.652
*** (0.124) 
Log (No. employees)  -0.393
*** (0.155)  -0.240  (0.173)  0.410
***  (0.180) 0.060  (0.055) 0.085  (0.057) 0.043  (0.052) 
Skilled workers (%)  -0.021
* (0.013) -0.024
**  (0.012) -0.009  (0.012) 0.001  (0.003) 0.000  (0.003) 0.002  (0.003) 
Minimum  wage  earners  (%)  0.002  (0.007) -0.009  (0.006) -0.005  (0.006) -0.002  (0.002) -0.001  (0.003) -0.001  (0.002) 
Flexible  benefits    0.310 (0.429)  0.369 (0.399)  -0.398  (0.415)  0.110 (0.138)  0.141 (0.144)  0.139 (0.139) 
Variable  pay  -0.129 (0.392)  -0.344 (0.479)  -0.109 (0.398)  0.232
*  (0.140) 0.172  (0.147) 0.183  (0.135) 
Collective  agreements       0.313  (0.224)  0.350  (0.229)  0.392
* (0.231) 
Union members (%)  -0.005  (0.006)  0.002  (0.005)  0.014
***  (0.005) 0.004  (0.004) 0.003  (0.004) 0.003  (0.004) 
Labour  costs  (%)  0.001  (0.008) -0.001  (0.009) -0.003  (0.010) 0.000  (0.004) -0.001  (0.004) -0.001  (0.004) 
Permanent  workers  (%)  0.003  (0.006) 0.004  (0.006) 0.000  (0.005) -0.002  (0.002) -0.002  (0.002) 0.000  (0.002) 
              
Number  of  observations 182  175  187  1266 1163 1283 
Pseudo R
2  0.079 0.064 0.110 0.035 0.035 0.031 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases with the 
importance, ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=not important, 2 = of minor importance, 3 = moderately important and 4 = very important.  




Importance of the following reasons in preventing wage cuts 
(Ordered logit estimates, weighted) 





Previous agreements between employees and employers  To prevent the loss of the firm’s reputation 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Agriculture,  forestry,  fishing  -0.178  (0.233) -0.238  (0.231) -0.154  (0.201) -0.001  (0.237) 0.085  (0.240) -0.289  (0.222) 
Construction -0.748
*** (0.208)  -0.327
* (0.210) -0.296  (0.207) -0.076  (0.230) 0.000  (0.234) 0.058  (0.224) 
Electricity, gas, water, mining  -0.073  (0.257)  -0.596
** (0.270)  -0.499
**  (0.264) 0.129  (0.249) 0.026  (0.251) 0.051  (0.231) 
Manufacturing -0.650
***  (0.189) -0.218  (0.211) -0.206  (0.206) -0.085  (0.203) -0.141  (0.215) -0.126  (0.208) 
Financial  services  -0.298  (0.265)  0.155 (0.274)  0.361 (0.280)  0.204 (0.315)  0.083 (0.340)  -0.051  (0.302) 
Transport, storage and comm.  -0.241  (0.194)  0.476
*** (0.213)  0.394
** (0.186) 0.503
*** (0.195)  0.550
*** (0.209)  0.488
*** (0.193) 
Education  and  health  -0.057  (0.266)  0.025 (0.257)  -0.071  (0.234)  0.330 (0.264)  0.449
* (0.272)  0.284  (0.261) 
Other services  0.505
*** (0.191) 0.186  (0.191)  -0.104  (0.180)  0.578
*** (0.180)  0.528
*** (0.186)  0.336
** (0.181) 
Region -0.830
*** (0.133)  -0.299
***  (0.133) -0.163  (0.120) -0.173  (0.133) -0.133  (0.138) -0.074  (0.130) 
Log (No. employees)  0.007  (0.052)  -0.064  (0.050)  -0.099
**  (0.049) -0.055  (0.050) -0.037  (0.054) -0.025  (0.049) 
Skilled  workers  (%)  -0.001  (0.003) 0.000  (0.003) -0.001  (0.003) -0.001  (0.003) 0.000  (0.003) -0.001  (0.003) 
Minimum  wage  earners  (%) 0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)  -0.003  (0.002)  0.000 (0.002)  0.002 (0.003)  0.000 (0.002) 
Flexible benefits   0.156  (0.134)  0.227
* (0.141)  0.228
*  (0.138) 0.162  (0.131) 0.223
* (0.140)  0.204  (0.136) 
Variable  pay  0.092  (0.131) 0.040  (0.140) -0.018  (0.133) -0.067  (0.136) -0.053  (0.148) -0.037  (0.134) 
Collective agreements  0.343
*  (0.212) 0.107  (0.224) 0.304  (0.229) -0.103  (0.234) -0.166  (0.239) -0.017  (0.232) 
Union members (%)  0.005  (0.006)  0.009
* (0.005)  0.014
***  (0.005) -0.001  (0.005) 0.000  (0.005) -0.002  (0.004) 
Labour  costs  (%)  -0.002  (0.003)  0.005 (0.004)  0.002 (0.003)  0.002 (0.004)  0.001 (0.004)  0.002 (0.004) 
Permanent workers (%)  -0.004
*** (0.002)  -0.004
***  (0.002) -0.002  (0.002) -0.002  (0.002) -0.003
* (0.002) -0.003
* (0.002) 
              
Number  of  observations  1266 1163 1283 1266 1163 1283 
Pseudo R
2  0.040 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.013 0.009 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases with the 
importance, ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=not important, 2 = of minor importance, 3 = moderately important and 4 = very important.  
Source: Authors calculations.  
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Finally, another reason for avoiding wage reductions was to prevent the loss of the firm’s 
reputation. This reason is important for firms in “other services” and transport, storage 
and communications, because these sectors might employ specialized workers and firms 
do not want their wage policy to be a deterrent for future employees (see Table 9).  
 
Complementarity among Theories on Wage Rigidities 
 
Summers (1988) and Agell and Benmarker (2007) point out that different sources of 
wage rigidity can operate at the same time, reinforcing one another. To explore the 
possible interaction between different theories, we computed Spearman rank correlations 
between the reasons for preventing wage cuts (see Tables 10a, 10b and 10c).  
 
The results show the reasons associated with the efficiency wage theory are highly 
correlated for all occupational groups.  Specifically, in all cases, the highest observed 
correlation is between do not affect employee’s motivation and do not affect worker’s 
effort and productivity. The former also is highly correlated with the reasons prevent the 
loss of the most productive and more experienced workers and minimize costs of labour 
turnover, which could indicate that firms prefer to keep their employees motivated, so as 
to avoid losing their most valuable workers and incurring the cost to train new workers. It 
is also worth mentioning that the presence of collective agreements is highly correlated 
with the reasons associated with the contract theory, given the bargaining power unions 
have to set long term contracts between firms and workers. 32 
 
Table 10a 
Spearman rank correlations between reasons for preventing wage cuts: Managers 
Reasons  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Legal restrictions (1)  1 . 0 0 0         
Previous agreements between employees and employers (2)  0.377
* 1.000        
To prevent the loss of the firm’s reputation (3)  0.092
* 0.298
* 1.000        
Do not affect employee’s motivation (4)  0.239
* 0.363
* 0.398
*  1.000      




* 1.000     





* 1.000    
To prevent the loss of the most productive and more 






* 1.000   
Do not affect relative wages in relation to competition 







* 1.000  
Collective agreements (9)  0.255
* 0.337
* 0.062 -0.060 0.048 0.018 -0.010 0.057 1.000 
Note: * denotes statistical significance at 1%. Number of observations 1,267, except for action (9), where the number of observations is 183.  
Source: Authors calculations.  
 
Table 10b 
Spearman rank correlations between reasons for preventing wage cuts: Professionals 
Reasons  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Legal restrictions (1)  1 . 0 0 0         
Previous agreements between employees and employers (2)  0.229
* 1.000        
To prevent the loss of the firm’s reputation (3)  0.048 0.399
* 1.000        
Do not affect employee’s motivation (4)  0.069 0.256
* 0.524
*  1.000      
Do not affect workers’ efforts and productivity (5)  0.064 0.323
* 0.517
* 0.773
* 1.000     





* 1.000    
To prevent the loss of the most productive and more 





* 1.000   
Do not affect relative wages in relation to competition 







* 1.000  
Collective agreements (9)  0.354
* 0.337
* 0.107 -0.013 0.048 0.032 0.097 0.011 1.000 
Note: * denotes statistical significance at 1%. Number of observations 1,164, except for action (9), where the number of observations is 176. 




Spearman rank correlations between reasons for preventing wage cuts: Technicians, assistants, and unskilled workers 
 
Reasons  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Legal restrictions (1)  1 . 0 0 0         
Previous agreements between employees and employers (2)  0.134
* 1.000        
To prevent the loss of the firm’s reputation (3)  -0.028 0.382
* 1.000        
Do not affect employee’s motivation (4)  -0.019 0.266
* 0.577
*  1.000      
Do not affect workers’ efforts and productivity (5)  0.007 0.303
* 0.566
* 0.759
* 1.000     





* 1.000    
To prevent the loss of the most productive and more 





* 1.000   
Do not affect relative wages in relation to competition 







* 1.000  
Collective agreements (9)  0.364
* 0.310
* -0.087 0.018 0.036 0.040 0.085 0.036 1.000 
Note: * denotes statistical significance at 1%. Number of observations 1,284, except for action (9), where the number of observations is 188.  






V. Firms’ Other Responses to an Economic Slowdown  
 
Besides considering changes in base wages, we examined other alternatives firms could 
use to adjust labour costs during a period of economic slowdown. According to Babecký 
et al. (2009b) and Fabiani et al. (2010), the use of alternative strategies has gained 
importance due to the existence of wage rigidities that make it difficult to cut wages to 
adjust the labour market. In particular, we included options related to remuneration for 
employees, other than base wages, and the firm’s personnel. The former includes the 
reduction of variable pay and non-statutory benefits
18, while the latter considers changes 
in the type of employment contract, laying off employees, hiring of workers at lower 
wages and not hiring anyone (See Table 11). 
 
The survey shows that, in all cases, around 30% of the firms consider the option of 
reducing non-statutory benefits and reducing variable pay as likely / very likely. The 
option of laying off employees is more common in the case of technicians, assistants and 
unskilled workers than in the case of managers and professionals, which suggests that 
firms are more reluctant to fire more skilled workers.
19 According to our survey, firms 
that found it difficult to fill vacancies argued the main reason was the lack of candidates 
with the required profile, especially in the case of managers. 
 
                                                            
18 Non-statutory benefits are determined either by collective agreements or set at the discretion of the 
employer. 
19 In fact, the mean score obtained with respect to this strategy is the highest for professionals and 




How likely is your firm to carry out the following actions? 
 

















Managers         
Mean score*  1.64  2.18  1.93 1.83 1.84 1.90 2.00 
Responses (%)         
   Not at all / not likely 81.2 58.2 70.8 73.6 70.5 68.9 78.6 
   Likely / very likely  18.8 41.8 29.2 26.4 29.5 31.1 21.4 
         
Professionals         
Mean  score*  1.86 2.21 2.20 2.14 1.82 1.90 1.76 
Responses  (%)         
   Not at all / not likely 72.2 56.6 59.6 59.3 70.5 71.0 87.7 
   Likely / very likely  27.8 43.4 40.4 40.7 29.5 29.0 12.3 
         
Technicians, assistants, 
and unskilled workers         
Mean  score*  1.93 2.08 2.34 2.14 1.75 1.90 1.77 
Responses  (%)         
   Not at all / not likely 68.8 63.3 53.4 60.9 74.0 73.0 87.0 
   Likely / very likely  31.2 36.7  46.6  39.1  26.0  27.0  13.0 
*Average score based on the following scale: 1 = not at all, 2 = not likely, 3 = likely, 4 = very likely.  




The alternative of a change the type of employment contract is also likely / very likely for 
about 30% of the firms. At the sector level, in agriculture, forestry and fishing the options 
of hiring new workers at lower wages and laying off employees have higher response 
rates for not at all / not likely than the other sectors with respect to professionals and 
technicians, assistants and unskilled workers. In the construction sector, the alternative of 
reducing variable pay has the highest response rates for not at all / not likely, in all 
occupations (83% on average). Lastly, in the case of agriculture, forestry and fishing, the 
alternative of hiring new workers at lower wages has the highest response rate for not at 
all / not likely, in all occupations (80% on average).  
 
The strategies to adjust labour costs in a period of economic slowdown are not mutually 
exclusive and firms could use more than one option. To evaluate the link between the 
different alternatives, Spearman rank correlations were calculated for the pairing of the 
different strategies (See Tables 12a, 12b and 12c). As expected, laying off employees and 
hiring new workers at lower wages have one of the highest correlation coefficients for all 
occupational positions, suggesting that some firms could use turnover to adjust labour 
costs. Similarly, the strategy of changing the type of employment contract is highly 
correlated with the options of laying off employees and hiring new works at lower wages, 
which might indicate that firms could deal with a difficult economic situation by 
recruiting workers under a different type of contract and at a lower wage. Another pair 
with high correlations is reducing non-statutory benefits and reducing variable pay. 
Similar results for Europe were obtained by Babecký et al. (2009b), who emphasized the 
complementary nature of these two strategies.  37 
 
Table 12a 
Spearman rank correlations between strategies to face a slowdown in economic 
activity: Managers 
 
Actions  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Change the type of employment contract (1)  1.000      
Do not hire anyone (2)  0.277
* 1.000     
Lay off employees (3)  0.418
* 0.427
* 1.000
*      
Hire new workers at lower wages (4)  0.425
* 0.313
* 0.491
* 1.000    




* 1.000   






Note: All correlations are significant at the 1% level. Number of observations 1,267, except for actions (5) and (6), 
where the number of observations is 947 and 678, respectively.  
Source: Authors calculations.  
 
Table 12b 
Spearman rank correlations between strategies to face a slowdown in economic 
activity: Professionals 
 
Actions  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Change the type of employment contract (1)  1.000      
Do not hire anyone (2)  0.094
* 1.000     
Lay off employees (3)  0.376
* 0.306
* 1.000      
Hire new workers at lower wages (4)  0.418
* 0.104
* 0.432
* 1.000     




* 1.000   






Note: All correlations are significant at the 1% level. Number of observations 1,164, except for actions (5) and (6), 
where the number of observations is 874 and 622, respectively.  
Source: Authors calculations.  
 
Table 12c 
Spearman rank correlations between strategies to face a slowdown in economic 
activity: Technicians, assistants, and unskilled workers 
 
Actions  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Change the type of employment contract (1)  1.000      
Do not hire anyone (2)  0.068 1.000     
Lay off employees (3)  0.346
* 0.221
* 1.000      
Hire new workers at lower wages (4)  0.423
* 0.053 0.382
* 1.000     




* 1.000   






Note: All correlations are significant at the 1% level. Number of observations 1,284, except for actions (5) and (6), 
where the number of observations is 955 and 673, respectively.  
Source: Authors calculations. 
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To analyse the determinants of the different strategies, ordered logit models were 
estimated using the same set of regressors as in the previous models. With regard to the 
likelihood of reducing non-statutory benefits, the results indicate that the probability of 
cutting them increases in firms with flexible benefits. On the contrary, the likelihood is 
lower in firms located in Bogotá and in firms operating in construction and financial 
services. In addition, the probability reduces as the percentage of workers with permanent 
contracts increases. As mentioned earlier, workers’ bargaining power might increase as 
the share of employees with more protected jobs increases. The strategy of reducing 
variable pay is less likely in firms operating in construction, manufacturing and financial 
services, where our survey shows that variable pay is more widespread (nearly 75% of 
the firms use this type of remuneration) (see Table 13). 
 
The next alternatives are related to the type of labour contract and changes in company 
personnel. Regarding a change in the type of employment contracts, in general, we find 
the likelihood of using this strategy decreases as the share of permanent workers and the 
size of the firm increase; this is also the case with the presence of collective agreements. 
On the contrary, the probability of changing employment contracts increases in firms 
with flexible benefits. Moreover, the results show the likelihood of not hiring anyone 
increases with the presence of collective agreements and with firm size. Conversely, the 
probability reduces with higher labour costs and in firms located in Bogotá. At the sector 
level, firms belonging to construction, manufacturing, financial services, and transport, 
storage and communications are less likely not to hire anyone (see Table 14). 39 
 
Table 13 
How likely it is for a firm to reduce benefits or to reduce variable pay  
(Ordered logit estimates, weighted) 
 





Reduce non-statutory benefits   Reduce variable pay 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 




*** (0.266)  -0.469
* (0.293) -0.863
*** (0.315)  -0.779
*** (0.304) 
Electricity,  gas,  water,  mining 0.184  (0.299) -0.005  (0.296) -0.011  (0.284) 0.325  (0.380) 0.346  (0.363) 0.324  (0.352) 




Financial services  -1.052
** (0.461) -0.885
** (0.428)  -1.128
*** (0.482)  -0.793
** (0.421)  -1.237
*** (0.438)  -1.140
*** (0.405) 
Transport,  storage,  comm.  -0.147  (0.218) -0.247  (0.225) -0.216  (0.217) -0.127  (0.264) -0.206  (0.282) 0.061  (0.278) 
Education  and  health  0.103  (0.301) -0.008  (0.315) -0.206  (0.308) 0.167  (0.430) 0.226  (0.433) 0.198  (0.436) 
Other  services  0.183 (0.231)  0.113 (0.243)  0.014 (0.233)  0.188 (0.236)  0.128 (0.252)  0.312 (0.260) 
Region -0.532
*** (0.157)  -0.350
** (0.168)  -0.351
**  (0.159) -0.232  (0.179) 0.007  (0.183) -0.081  (0.177) 
Log (No. employees)  0.058
*  (0.057) 0.080  (0.062) 0.038  (0.056) -0.070  (0.073) -0.030  (0.070) -0.029  (0.065) 
Skilled  workers  (%)  0.002 (0.003)  0.002 (0.004)  0.001 (0.004)  0.002 (0.004)  0.001 (0.004)  -0.005  (0.004) 
Minimum wage earners (%)  -0.002  (0.003)  -0.001  (0.003)  -0.006
**  (0.003) 0.000  (0.003) 0.001  (0.004) -0.004  (0.004) 
Flexible benefits   0.519
*** (0.152) 0.417
*** (0.157)  0.272
** (0.150) 0.234  (0.172) 0.365
** (0.187) 0.239  (0.182) 
Variable pay  0.272
* (0.161)  0.241  (0.168)  0.301
**  ( 0 . 1 6 0 )         
Collective agreements  0.194  (0.239)  0.108  (0.264)  -0.160  (0.263)  1.052
*** (0.288)  0.566
** (0.323) 0.328  (0.323) 
Union  members  (%)  -0.005  (0.005) 0.002  (0.005) -0.002  (0.005) -0.006  (0.007) -0.004  (0.006) -0.006  (0.007) 
Labour  costs  (%)  -0.001  (0.005) 0.000  (0.005) -0.002  (0.005) -0.001  (0.004) -0.001  (0.005) -0.001  (0.005) 
Permanent workers (%)  -0.003
* (0.002)  -0.004
* (0.002) -0.002  (0.002) -0.001  (0.002) -0.003  (0.003) 0.001  (0.002) 
              
Number  of  observations  946 873 954 677 621 672 
Pseudo R
2  0.039 0.028 0.028 0.024 0.028 0.029 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases with the likelihood, 
ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=not at all, 2 = not likely, 3 = likely and 4 = very likely. 






How likely it is for a firm to change the type of employment contract or not to hire anyone  
(Ordered logit estimates, weighted) 
 





Change the type of employment contract  Not to hire anyone 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing  -0.311  (0.248)  -0.409
* (0.251) -0.334  (0.234) -0.103  (0.218) -0.096  (0.223) -0.454
** (0.226) 
Construction -0.570
*** (0.240)  0.054  (0.215)  -0.035  (0.206)  -0.455
** (0.227)  -0.479
** (0.230)  -0.559
*** (0.219) 
Electricity, gas, water, mining  -0.001  (0.287)  -0.193  (0.319)  -0.473
* (0.289) 0.181  (0.272) -0.180  (0.280) -0.048  (0.255) 
Manufacturing -0.374




Financial  services  -0.503  (0.350)  0.442 (0.309)  0.231 (0.308)  -0.603
** (0.299)  -0.603
** (0.303)  -0.703
*** (0.315) 
Transport, storage, comm.  -0.018  (0.200)  0.428
** (0.214) 0.401
** (0.195) -0.516
*** (0.188)  -0.556
*** (0.204)  -0.449
*** (0.191) 
Education  and  health  -0.018  (0.302) 0.327  (0.279) 0.200  (0.257) -0.195  (0.285) -0.388  (0.301) -0.480
* (0.276) 
Other services  0.215  (0.186)  -0.053  (0.194)  -0.341
** (0.188)  0.328
*  (0.185) 0.228  (0.195) 0.058  (0.178) 
Region -0.289
** (0.136) 0.245
* (0.136)  0.418
*** (0.127)  -0.400
*** (0.130)  -0.370
*** (0.136)  -0.248
** (0.128) 
Log (No. employees)  -0.023  (0.054)  -0.140
*** (0.051)  -0.109
*** (0.047)  0.195
*** (0.047)  0.175
*** (0.050)  0.173
*** (0.048) 
Skilled  workers  (%)  0.000  (0.003) -0.003  (0.003) -0.002  (0.003) 0.004  (0.003) 0.004  (0.003) 0.006
** (0.003) 
Minimum  wage  earners  (%) -0.001  (0.003)  0.000 (0.003)  0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)  0.002 (0.003)  0.000 (0.002) 
Flexible benefits   0.228
* (0.140)  0.431
*** (0.146)  0.297
** (0.144) 0.173
*  (0.134) 0.115  (0.140) 0.083  (0.135) 
Variable  pay  0.198  (0.142) -0.035  (0.145) -0.061  (0.137) 0.202  (0.129) 0.201  (0.136) -0.021  (0.129) 
Collective agreements  -0.177  (0.265)  -0.416
* (0.268) -0.436
* (0.255) 0.655
*** (0.232)  0.636
*** (0.227)  0.767
*** (0.221) 
Union  members  (%)  0.002 (0.005)  0.002 (0.004)  0.000 (0.005)  0.002 (0.005)  0.004 (0.005)  -0.003  (0.005) 
Labour costs (%)  0.001  (0.005)  0.002  (0.004)  0.005  (0.003)  -0.008
*** (0.003)  -0.008
*** (0.003)  -0.007
*** (0.003) 
Permanent workers (%)  -0.006
*** (0.002)  -0.005
***  (0.002) -0.002  (0.002) 0.000  (0.002) 0.000  (0.002) 0.001  (0.002) 
              
Number  of  observations  1266 1163 1283 1266 1163 1283 
Pseudo R
2  0.021 0.017 0.016 0.036 0.033 0.025 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases with the likelihood, 
ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=not at all, 2 = not likely, 3 = likely and 4 = very likely. 




The alternative of laying off workers is less likely in Bogotá and in firms in agriculture, 
forestry and fishing and more likely in firms with flexible benefits and those operating in 
transport, storage and communications. For technicians, assistants and unskilled workers, 
the presence of collective agreements reduces the probability of laying off workers (see 
Table 15).  
 
The main determinants of the possibility of hiring new workers at lower wages differ 
among occupational groups. In the case of managers, the most important explanatory 
variables are labour intensity, the presence of variable pay and firm size. For 
professionals, the existence of flexible benefits, the location of the firm and the sector 
where the firm operates are the most significant determinants. Finally, for technicians, 
assistants and unskilled workers, the share of minimum wages earners and the share of 
employees on a permanent contract are significant explanatory factors, besides sector and 
location of the firm (see Table 15).  42 
 
Table 15 
How likely it is for a firm to lay off employees or to hire new workers at lower wages  
(Ordered logit estimates, weighted) 
 





Lay off employees   Hire new workers at lower wages 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Managers Professionals  Technicians, 
assistants and 
unskilled workers 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing  -0.424
** (0.234) -0.625
*** (0.239)  -0.456
**  (0.226) -0.167  (0.236) -0.508
** (0.232)  -0.357
* (0.215) 
Construction  -0.128  (0.223)  0.288 (0.210)  0.225 (0.201)  -0.259  (0.225)  0.442
** (0.216) 0.452
** (0.208) 
Electricity, gas, water, mining  0.135 (0.251) -0.423 (0.279) -0.360 (0.265) 0.292 (0.268) 0.224 (0.263) -0.093 (0.255) 
Manufacturing -0.342
*  (0.193)  0.079 (0.192)  0.054 (0.186)  -0.273  (0.187)  0.366
** (0.188) 0.518
*** (0.187) 
Financial  services  -0.446  (0.323)  0.119 (0.298)  0.095 (0.259)  -0.533
* (0.347) 0.524  (0.366) 0.719
** (0.335) 
Transport, storage, comm.  0.084  (0.194)  0.517
*** (0.205)  0.376
** (0.199) 0.266  (0.193) 0.715
*** (0.202)  0.817
*** (0.190) 
Education  and  health  -0.128  (0.272)  0.140 (0.270)  0.061 (0.255)  0.308 (0.272)  0.901
*** (0.273)  0.486
** (0.233) 
Other services  0.324
** (0.173)  0.123  (0.180) -0.103  (0.179) 0.565
*** (0.187)  0.312
* (0.187)  0.181  (0.181) 
Region -0.635
*** (0.133)  -0.329
*** (0.136)  -0.246
**  (0.122) -0.177  (0.129) 0.455
*** (0.136)  0.679
*** (0.122) 
Log (No. employees)  0.091
**  (0.048)  -0.008 (0.050)  -0.033 (0.045)  0.146
***  (0.052) -0.026  (0.053) -0.020  (0.044) 
Skilled workers (%)  0.003  (0.003)  0.006
*  (0.003) 0.002  (0.003) -0.001  (0.003) -0.003  (0.003) -0.002  (0.003) 
Minimum  wage  earners  (%)  0.001  (0.002) 0.001  (0.003) 0.000  (0.003) -0.002  (0.002) -0.002  (0.003) -0.007
*** (0.002) 
Flexible benefits   0.172  (0.141)  0.502
*** (0.142)  0.417
***  (0.136) 0.160  (0.134) 0.269
** (0.143) 0.179  (0.139) 
Variable pay 0.215
* (0.137) 0.066 (0.140) 0.006 (0.128) 0.309
** (0.138) 0.238
* (0.148) 0.109 (0.137) 
Collective agreements  -0.019  (0.226)  -0.176  (0.227)  -0.384
** (0.224)  0.377
*  (0.227) 0.130  (0.244) -0.081  (0.239) 
Union members (%)  0.010
***  (0.005)  0.008 (0.005)  0.008 (0.005)  -0.007
* (0.005) -0.007  (0.005) -0.006  (0.005) 
Labour costs (%)  -0.001  (0.004)  0.001  (0.004)  -0.001  (0.003)  -0.009
**  (0.004) -0.004  (0.004) -0.006
* (0.003) 
Permanent workers (%)  -0.002  (0.002)  -0.003
* (0.002) -0.002  (0.002) -0.003
* (0.002) -0.002  (0.002) -0.003
** (0.002) 
              
Number  of  observations  1266 1163 1283 1266 1163 1283 
Pseudo R
2  0.026 0.017 0.011 0.028 0.021 0.034 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases with the likelihood, 
ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=not at all, 2 = not likely, 3 = likely and 4 = very likely. 




VI.  Conclusions 
 
This paper uses data from a unique wage setting survey of 1,305 Colombian firms to 
explore the nature and source of wage rigidities. Our sample is fully representative of the 
population under study and includes nine economic sectors, three firm sizes and three 
occupational groups. This is the first study for a non-European emerging economy that 
uses evidence from a survey of firms to study wage rigidities.  
 
The survey provides evidence of nominal and real downward wage rigidities in 
Colombia. The results show that during difficult times firms would be more willing to 
freeze wages and to increase them below the inflation rate as opposed to cutting wages. 
The most important reasons why Colombian firms do not reduce wages during difficult 
times are to prevent the loss of the most productive and experienced workers, to not 
affect the worker’s effort and productivity and to not affect the worker’s motivation, all 
of which are associated with the efficiency wage theory. Interestingly, these results are 
similar to those found in the literature for developed countries, despite differences in 
labour market institutions. 
 
In summary, these results suggest downward wage rigidity in Colombia could be 
explained by the efficiency wage theory. It is worth mentioning that the reasons 
associated with the different versions of the efficiency wage theory are highly correlated. 
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Ordered  logit regressions were used to determine what factors are related to wage 
rigidities. The findings indicate that permanent contracts impose more wage rigidity than 
other types of contracts, since workers are more protected by labour legislation. In 
addition, workforce composition and labour intensity play an important role in explaining 
of wage rigidities. For less skilled workers, the presence of collective agreements 
increases wage rigidity. Regarding the reasons preventing wage cuts, we found the 
sources of wage rigidity differ according to economic sector, firm location and firm size. 
For example, greater support for the adverse selection model and the shirking model is 
found among large firms and in those operating in the “other services” sector, which is 
comprised of specialized workers.  
 
Survey evidence also suggests firms could use other alternatives to adjust costs in 
difficult times, since wage cuts are not usual. These alternatives include reducing non-
statutory benefits and variable pay, laying off employees, changing the type of 
employment contract and hiring new workers at lower wages. The use of these strategies 
varies across economic sectors and occupational groups.  
 
Finally, this paper contributes to a better understanding of wage rigidities and their 
sources at the firm level in Colombia. This is important for the monetary policy 
transmission process in a context of low inflation and high unemployment. In addition, 
the results help to improve the micro-foundation of macroeconomic models used in 
monetary policy decisions.  
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